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“Final” Awards Reconceptualized: A 
Proposal to Resolve the Hall Street 
Circuit Split 
Matthew J. Brown* 
INTRODUCTION 
 Before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc.,1 the federal appellate courts had generally agreed to the 
existence of non-statutory grounds for the vacatur of arbitral awards.2  
Among these grounds, every circuit had adopted some form of the “manifest 
disregard of the law” (manifest disregard) standard.3  Manifest disregard 
most commonly refers to the principle that a court may vacate an arbitration 
award if the arbitrator knows that a law applies and deliberately disregards 
 
*Matthew J. Brown is a recent graduate of George Mason University School of Law, where he 
served as a Notes Editor for the George Mason Law Review.  While in law school, he received a 
certificate in global arbitration law and practice from Hamline University School of Law, in 
cooperation with Queen Mary, University of London.  Before law school he obtained a B.A. from 
Wake Forest University.  He is currently Research Director at the Institute of International Banking 
Law and Practice.  He is also coaching the Kabul University Vis Moot Team in the 11th Willem C. 
Vis (East) International Commercial Arbitration Moot.  The author would like to thank Professors 
Ross E. Davies and Thomas E. Carbonneau for their thoughtful suggestions during the writing 
process, and Angela Diveley and Brian Ziff-Levine for their invaluable editing advice.  Most 
importantly, he would like to thank his fiancée Kristin Gilroy for her love, patience, and support 
without which this Comment would not have been possible. 
1. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
2. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the 
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 443, 450–51 (1998). 
3. Reid S. Manley & Zachary D. Miller, Disregarding “Manifest Disregard”: The Effect of 
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. and Its Progeny on the Standard for Arbitral Review, 
FDCC Q., at 357, 360 (Summer 2010) (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 
1460 (11th Cir. 1997)); accord James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 763 (2009) (“Following Wilko, every 
circuit ultimately adopted manifest disregard of the law as a separate ground for vacatur of an 
award.”); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur after Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1103, 1111 (2009); Ann C. Gronlund, Note, The Future of Manifest Disregard as a Valid 
Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards in Light of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 96 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1359 (2011). 
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it, rather than vacating the award for misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law.4  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street, it did so 
solely to answer the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).5 
“preclude[d] a federal court from enforcing the parties’ clearly expressed 
agreement providing for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration 
award.”6  However, in the process of answering this question, the Court 
inadvertently cast doubt on the continued validity of all non-statutory 
grounds for vacatur.7  In the wake of Hall Street, a sharp split has occurred 
among the circuit courts as to the continuing validity of manifest disregard.8 
The FAA does not grant courts the authority to review the merits of an 
arbitrator’s decision.9  Yet, despite the doctrine’s widespread acceptance, 
 
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (9th ed. 2009); see McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts. 
Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e mean by ‘manifest disregard of the law’ a situation 
‘where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law—and then ignored 
it.’”) (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess 
of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 1 (2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/817.pdf (“Manifest disregard is a common-law exception to the limited grounds for vacatur of 
arbitral awards enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). [The] doctrine empowers courts to 
refuse to enforce awards that evince a ‘manifest disregard of the law,’ understood to mean a willful 
defiance of clearly applicable law, not just garden-variety legal error.”). 
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
6. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 
(2008) (No. 06-989); see Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581. 
7. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 3 (“If the FAA standards are ‘exclusive,’ are judicially-crafted 
vacatur standards—which almost all circuits have recognized in the guise of ‘manifest 
disregard,’ . . . —no longer viable?” (footnote omitted)). 
8. Compare Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010), Med. Shoppe 
Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010), and Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. 
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009), with Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 
1277 (9th Cir. 2009), & Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), 
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
9. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through 
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 132–33 n.48 (2002) (explaining that the drafters of the 
FAA specifically rejected the “English model that allowed judicial review of arbitration award for 
legal questions, and . . . insiste[d] that ‘once the parties have agreed upon arbitration, they must 
accept the result the arbitrator reaches no matter how obviously and plainly wrong it appears’”) 
(quoting Wharton Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 676–78 (1927)).  
Courts and commentators take this notion for granted today.  So much so, they often do not even 
provide citations when making the claim, perhaps believing the notion self-evident from the statute.  
See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (“[A] party who has not 
agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits of its dispute 
(say, as here, its obligation under a contract).  But, where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or she, 
in effect, has relinquished much of that right’s practical value.”); Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 
11-55587, 2012 WL 336135, at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2012) (“Indeed, § 10 of the FAA provides no 
authorization for a merits review.”); White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v. Glawson Invs. Corp., 660 
F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Even though White Springs presents its argument in terms of the 
FAA, it asks us to do what we may not—look to the legal merits of the underlying award.”); 
Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg. Corp., 331 F. App’x 925, 927 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
2
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courts and commentators alike have questioned and condemned manifest 
disregard as a potential “back door” to merits review.10  In its Hall Street 
decision, the Court likewise displayed uneasiness with manifest disregard, 
focusing its attention on the underpinnings of the doctrine.11  This seems to 
suggest the tenuous footing manifest disregard currently holds will give way, 
and the Court will officially eliminate the doctrine.  Nonetheless, the Court 
has remained reluctant to jettison the nearly fifty-year-old doctrine.12   
Seeking to ease the reluctance, this Comment argues that manifest 
disregard’s inconsistencies with arbitration’s “benefits of the bargain” 
should lead to dismissal of manifest disregard.  The prospect of the Court 
formally abandoning manifest disregard has set off alarm bells for some.  
One commentator even went so far as to state that “[i]f ‘manifest disregard’ 
is eliminated, arbitral finality will rise above the crowning principle of the 
American constitutional system: ‘No man in this country is so high that he is 
above the law.’”13  However, absent manifest disregard, the FAA had 
 
“parties to the contract may not appeal the merits of the arbitration”); Brief of Arbitration Professors 
Richard C. Reuben, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the 
District Court Order, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3247-cv), 
available at http://law.missouri.edu/news/pdf/reuben_amicus_brief.pdf; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 541 (5th ed. 2009) 
(summarily stating that “FAA § 10 does not recognize merits review”). 
10. E.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, 
J.) (“If [manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is 
inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbitration.”); CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 541 (“[T]he 
common-law grounds [including manifest disregard] appear to authorize the courts to review the 
merits of arbitral determinations.”); Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1 (“[Manifest disregard] opens the 
door to judicial review of the legal merits of arbitral awards, which modern arbitration law has long 
viewed as inimical to core process values such as efficiency and finality.”). 
11. See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 585 (“Then there is the vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing. 
Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it 
merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.”); infra Part I.C. 
(discussing the history and development of manifest disregard). 
12. To date, the Court has granted certiorari for only one case in which manifest disregard was 
at issue; however, the Court specifically declined to decide the continued validity of manifest 
disregard. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767–68 n.3 (2010) (“We 
do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street] as an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10.”). 
13. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” 
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 137 (2011). 
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already granted courts the authority to review arbitral awards without 
disturbing their merits.14 
While the arbitration process provides the mechanism for the resolution 
of disputes, it possesses no internal mechanism for enforcement.  If a 
disappointed party refuses to abide by an arbitral award, the prevailing party 
must then turn to a court to seek enforcement.15  Accordingly, the arbitration 
process rests on the foundation that a court will enforce the arbitral award.16  
At least in the international context, where a court finds an award 
unenforceable, that award demonstrates a lack of finality.17  This Comment 
suggests a common sense approach, since there is nothing truly final about 
an unenforceable arbitral award.  Specifically, this Comment argues that the 
word “final,” as it appears in FAA § 10(a)(4),18 requires the enforceability of 
an award in addition to its traditional definition.  In practice, the 
reconceptualization consists of a two-step process.  A court must first 
determine whether an award, as written, is enforceable and therefore “final” 
under section 10(a)(4).  If, on the other hand, the award is not final, the court 
must then decide whether the award can be modified without disturbing its 
merits under section 11(c).19 
 
14. The FAA provides courts with three options for the review of arbitral awards: 
enforcement, vacatur or modification.  9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006). 
15. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 (“The private practice of arbitration [is] of little 
practical use without the authority of court enforcement . . . .”); see also Richard C. Reuben, Process 
Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 282 
(2007) (“[E]nforceability is crucial because many parties can reasonably be expected simply to 
ignore an adverse award if it is not binding.”). 
16. See Reuben, supra note 15, at 282 (“Without enforceability, arbitrators would only be able 
to issue what in effect would be advisory opinions.”). 
17. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 419 (2d ed. 1991).  “Lack of finality of an award may manifest itself in 
a number of ways, and lead to refusal of enforcement under the provisions of law governing the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments.”  Id. 
18. The subsection provides as follows: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein 
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration— 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
19. Federal Arbitration Act § 11(c) allows “the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the 
application of any party to the arbitration— . . . [w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not 
affecting the merits of the controversy.  The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect 
the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.” 9 U.S.C. § 11(c). 
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss2/5
[Vol. 13: 325, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
329 
Part I describes the histories of arbitration, the FAA, the finality of 
arbitral awards, and the manifest disregard doctrine, emphasizing the way in 
which the doctrine deprives parties of the benefits of the arbitration bargain.  
Part II describes the circuit split over the continued validity of manifest 
disregard as either a valid or invalid statutory or non-statutory ground for 
vacatur.  Finally, Part III resolves the split by abolishing manifest disregard 
and then reconceptualizing “final” as currently understood under 
section 10(a)(4) through the two-step procedure.20 
I.  A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION AND ARBITRATION LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. Arbitration and the Benefits of the Arbitration Bargain 
Arbitration as a mechanism for dispute resolution has existed since 
some of the earliest days of recorded history.21  The arbitration process 
developed because parties wished to resolve their disputes in a more 
efficient and expeditious manner than that provided by traditional courts.22  
The arbitration process formalized and expanded with the development of 
Lex Mercatoria (Law Merchant).23  The Law Merchant evolved in the early 
Court Merchant fairs where itinerant merchants valued efficiency and 
finality in the resolution of disputes, since, as traveling merchants, they 
 
20. The scope of this Comment pertains to arbitrations as originally envisioned by the FAA, 
namely as a mechanism for dispute resolution between sophisticated commercial parties who 
bargained at arms’ length.  See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal 
Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1926) (“Arbitration under the Federal and similar statutes 
is simply a new procedural remedy, particularly adapted to the settlement of commercial 
disputes . . . .  No one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate.  Such action by a party is 
entirely voluntary.”)   Compare id. at 278 (“An agreement for arbitration is a business contract.”).  
To the extent that arbitration has expanded beyond this original context, many of the same principles 
can and should be applied; however, such application warrants further scholarship.  For such a 
discussion included in the context of abandoning the manifest disregard standard, see generally, 
Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005). 
21. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 266; see Reuben, supra note 15, at 279 (“Arbitration 
became formalized in the commercial context with the rise of the craftsmen’s gilds and Court 
Merchant fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.”). 
22. See Reuben, supra note 3, at 1104 (describing the “very predicate” of arbitration and the 
alternative dispute resolution process generally as the notion that “parties can do a better job of 
resolving their disputes through private ordering than public courts can through public ordering”). 
23. Reuben, supra note 15, at 279. 
5
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could not remain long in a single community.24  The Law Merchant became 
“a special law administered by special Courts for a special class of 
people.”25  In other words, the Law Merchant and its arbitration process 
developed alongside and outside of the common law.26 
Under the Law Merchant, in contrast to the common law, arbitration did 
not develop a unified code of substantive principles, instead largely 
remaining a matter of free decision.27  In place of the substantive principles, 
fellow merchants would judge each case in terms of practical expediency, 
often grounding their decisions in the ethical or economic norms of the 
particular groups to which the disputing merchants belonged.28  After a 
dispute arose, but prior to the commencement of arbitration, the parties 
delegated the authority to resolve the dispute to the arbitrators through a 
contract or sometimes as a requirement of membership in a particular 
merchant gild.29 
To proceed to arbitration in modern times, parties must formally agree 
to arbitrate their disputes.30  As a result, arbitration is a creature of contract.31  
Within the arbitration agreement, parties may consent to a set of governing 
adjudication principles and procedures by which a neutral third party shall 
resolve the dispute.32  Essentially, the arbitration agreement acts as an opt-
out provision from the court system, bypassing traditional judges in favor of 
 
24. Id. (footnote omitted). 
25. Id. at 279 n.44 (quoting Thomas Edward Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the 
Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7, 9 (1909)). 
26. WINDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT (Fred B. Rothman & 
Co. 1986) (1923) (describing “the custom of merchants [as being] recognized as a law apart from the 
common law”); see also Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747 (“Law Merchant [] developed in 
England to address the particular needs of merchants that the common law did not serve.”).  For an 
extended discussion on the history of conflict between the Law Merchant and the common law, see 
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 71–83 (1918). 
27. Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 
132, 132 (1934). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 133. 
30. CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 2; see Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 281 
(“Arbitration under the law depends upon a written instrument.”). 
31. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) 
(“Arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those 
disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . .”); see Cohen & 
Dayton, supra note 20, at 278 (“An agreement for arbitration is a business contract. It should be as 
inviolable as any other business contract, and once it is violated the law should give an adequate 
remedy.”). 
32. See Reuben, supra note 3, at 1104; see Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747 (describing the 
“grant of powers to arbitrators via submission to the process”). 
6
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a neutral third party.33  When the parties consent, the agreement binds them 
to the arbitrator’s determination.34 
As with other bargained-for exchanges, arbitration has benefits to its 
bargain.35  Among them, finality and efficiency stand out as the primary 
benefits of the arbitration bargain.36  To avoid the inflexible adherence to 
substantive and procedural law promised by the court system, “parties often 
agree to arbitrate precisely because they desire a streamlined process that 
emphasizes efficiency and the preservation of business relationships over 
technical fidelity to the law.”37  Indeed, as Professor Richard Reuben 
observes, “the notion of substantive ‘correctness’ or ‘accuracy’ historically 
has had little place in arbitration precisely because arbitration calls for the 
exercise of worldly judgment that is informed by a variety of considerations 
that may not lend themselves to an objective notion of correctness or 
accuracy.”38  By bargaining for a streamlined and final process, parties to 
arbitration opt out of the high costs, long delays, and contentious discovery 
that often attend litigation.39  In other words, the benefit of the arbitration 
 
33. Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006); Reuben, supra note 3, at 
1104 (“[A]rbitration empowers parties to choose to opt out of public ordering from the outset . . . .”). 
34. See Reuben, supra note 15, at 282 (“Like those of public judges, the decisions of 
commercial arbitrators are fully enforceable by the public courts when the parties agree that the 
award is to be binding . . . .”); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 267 (“A written provision 
for arbitration . . . is made valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon the grounds for which any 
contract may be revoked.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
35. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1:1 (4th ed.1993 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] (“The goal of contract 
law is to hold parties to their agreements so that they receive the benefits of their bargains.”); cf. 2 
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999 & 
Supp. 2011) (identifying bases for the enforcement of an informal contract at common law as 
including “something given as an agreed exchange, benefits received by the promisor, [or] 
detriments incurred by the promisee”); id. at § 5.9 (“There is no doubt that most enforceable 
promises are made by the promisor for the purpose of getting in return something that the promisor 
regards as beneficial. Promises are made to pay for work, goods or title to land. If bargained for, 
these beneficial subjects of exchange are consideration for a promise.”). 
36. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1 (referring to finality and efficiency as the “core process 
values” of arbitration); Hayford, supra note 2, at 505 (describing the final and binding nature of the 
arbitrator’s award as the “bargain inherent in the agreement to arbitrate”); Stephen L. Hayford, 
Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of 
Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 117, 118 (1998) (describing finality as “the process[‘s] . . . most 
essential feature”). 
37. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 11. 
38. Reuben, supra note 15, at 282. 
39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (“[A] party ‘trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and 
7
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bargain consists of the finality and efficiency of the arbitrator’s decision 
because that is what the parties have bargained for in place of a traditional 
court proceeding.40 
Similar to other types of contracts, arbitration agreements involve risks 
particular to their bargain.41  This risk lies in the potentially adverse arbitral 
decision coupled with limited judicial review.42  As stated though, this risk is 
balanced by a potentially favorable arbitral award coupled with the 
adversary’s limited right to judicial review.43  Arbitration also includes the 
inherent risk of what Professor Reuben terms “abnormal awards.”44  This 
potential cannot be allowed to undermine the arbitral process, however, 
because “the possibility of the abnormal award is simply one of those risks 
that is a part of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate.”45  As such, parties must 
account for this risk at the contracting stage, rather than at the enforcement 
stage when one of the parties has already realized part of the bargain.  After 
all, freely entered arbitration agreements have the same force of law as any 
other contract.46  As Professor Samuel Williston once noted: 
The goal of contract law is to hold parties to their agreements so that they receive the 
benefits of their bargains.  It is not the function of the courts to relieve a party to a freely 
 
expedition of arbitration.’”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Reuben, supra note 3, at 1129–30; Reuben, supra note 15, at 279 
(“[A]rbitration can be faster and cheaper than the courts, in part because it averts the long waiting 
time for a trial in some jurisdictions, the large legal and expert witness fees generated by extensive 
pre-trial discovery and long, complex trials, and the delay to the implementation of an adjudicatory 
decision that can be caused by appeals.”). 
40. Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: 
Contemplating the Use and Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 
241, 259–60 (1993) (quoting Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
41. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 35, at § 1:1 (“[Contract law] is intended to 
enforce the expectancy interests created by the parties’ promises so that they can allocate risks and 
costs during their bargaining.”); cf. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (describing the “normal risk of a fixed-price contract” as the possibility 
“that the market price will change. If it rises, the buyer gains at the expense of the seller . . . if it 
falls, as here, the seller gains at the expense of the buyer.”). 
42. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (“By 
including an arbitration clause in their contract the parties agree to submit disputes arising out of the 
contract to a nonjudicial forum, and we do not allow the disappointed party to bring his dispute into 
court by the back door, arguing that he is entitled to appellate review of the arbitrators’ decision.”); 
cf. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1148. 
43. See supra note 39. 
44. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1148.  Although arbitration lacks the appellate procedures of 
traditional adjudication that serve to “correct” or “normalize” judgments that might fall outside of 
party expectations, this should not surprise parties to an arbitration proceeding, because “[w]hen 
they contract to take their cases out of the public system, parties are opting for an informal system of 
‘rough justice.’”  Id. 
45. See id. 
46. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 259. 
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negotiated contract of the burdens of a provision which becomes more onerous than had 
originally been anticipated.47 
As a creature of contract, the tenets of contract law hold particular 
significance to arbitration jurisprudence. 
B. The Federal Arbitration Act 
At the same time arbitration developed as a means to resolve 
commercial disputes, judicial animosity emerged against the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.48  English common law courts jealously guarded 
their jurisdiction due to a concern that the specific enforcement of arbitration 
agreements might impede or interfere with the regular judicial 
administration of justice.49  This hostility developed before the common law 
doctrine of binding contracts had fully formed.50  However, as contracts 
became recognized as binding, arbitration agreements lagged behind and 
judicial hostility persisted.51  Then, with the adoption of English common 
law, the judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements became incorporated 
in America.52  Unlike England, however, the special institutions that 
supported the Law Merchant did not follow mercantilism to America, 
leaving colonial merchants to find new ways of resolving their trade 
disputes.53 
Flourishing commerce in the United States highlighted the need for 
decreased judicial hostility toward the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, finally coming to a head in the late 1910s.54  Although hesitant 
to enforce agreements, judges were more willing to enforce awards rendered 
 
47. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 35, at § 1:1. 
48. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 746–47. 
49. Id. (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 452 (1874)) (alterations original).  For 
an extended discussion of the common law doctrines of ouster and revocability by which courts 
refused to enforce arbitration agreements, see Wolaver, supra note 27, at 138–44. See also Berger & 
Sun, supra note 3, at 747–48. 
50. COHEN, supra note 26, at 60–70; Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 n.15. 
51. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748 n.15 (citing Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the 
Impact of Modern Arbitration on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 479, 489 (1995)). 
52. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 245; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985) (describing “an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to 
arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law.”). 
53. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 747. 
54. Id. at 748–53. 
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after the parties had submitted their disputes to arbitration.55  In fact, some 
courts did not philosophically oppose enforcing arbitration agreements but 
for the persistence of the old common law doctrines which handcuffed these 
judges from enforcing the agreements.56  Hence, the need arose to remove 
the old common law doctrines and to give judges the proper tools to enforce 
arbitration agreements.57  This climate of unenforceable agreements yet 
enforceable awards provided the backdrop for the drafting of the FAA.  As a 
result, the statute focuses on the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
rather than awards.58 
The New York Chamber of Commerce, a driving force behind the 
drafting of the FAA, wished to have a federal law to complement the newly 
enacted New York state law, which enforced arbitration agreements.59  At 
the time, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction refused to enforce 
arbitration agreements without a federal statute.60  Enacted in 1925 as the 
United States Arbitration Act, the FAA consists of sixteen provisions, “most 
of which are quite brief” and “relatively cryptic.”61  The heart of the act, 
contained in section 2, provides for the enforcement of valid arbitration 
 
55. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
233, 244 (2008); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 270; e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 345 
(1854) (“If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, 
after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law 
or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the 
judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of 
litigation.”). 
56. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 38–39 (1924) [hereinafter Joint 
Hearings] (brief of Julius Henry Cohen) (citing U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trin. Lake Petrol. Co., 222 
F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); President of Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250 
(1872)); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 274–75, 283 (citing same). 
57. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 752 (describing the New York Arbitration Law—the 
precursor and model for the FAA—as “provid[ing] the tools to the courts for enforcing a valid 
agreement to arbitration”). 
58. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding 
Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 170 (2008); Gronlund, supra 
note 3, at 1356–57; see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“[T]he 
purpose behind [the FAA’s] passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made 
agreements to arbitrate.”); Reuben, supra note 15, at 285 (“The primary purpose of the FAA was 
narrow: to repeal the centuries-old ‘ouster’ or ‘revocability’ doctrine, under which both English and 
American courts refused to enforce commercial agreements to arbitrate.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
59. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 245 (citation omitted). 
60. Id. (citation omitted). 
61. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68–401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified 
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)); Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 246 n.54. 
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agreements in the same manner as any other enforceable contract.62  The 
FAA then lays out the procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards 
except in certain circumstances such as fraud or corruption.63  In the event of 
ambiguity or mistake, the FAA also provides for limited judicial 
modification of arbitral awards so long as the merits of the controversy 
remain unaffected.64  As Professor Thomas Carbonneau points out, “[t]he 
FAA’s central provisions are sections 1, 2, 3, and 10—2 and 10 are all that is 
really necessary.”65  Whatever grounds for vacatur that do exist, the 
language of section 10 completely excludes the review of the merits of 
arbitral decisions.66  For the purposes of this Comment, section 10(a)(4) lists 
the relevant and disputed grounds for vacatur of an award.67 
C. Functus Officio and the Finality of Arbitral Awards 
As the Second Circuit stated in 1980, “[i]n order to be ‘final,’ an 
arbitration award must be intended by the arbitrators to be their complete 
determination of all claims submitted to them.”68  This statement 
encompasses the traditional notion of arbitral finality, where an arbitral 
award is only considered “final” under § 10(a)(4) if it resolves the dispute to 
such an extent that the parties need not litigate further to finalize their 
obligations.69  However, this does not exhaust the discussion of arbitral 
finality.  While the judiciary still remained hostile to arbitration, judges 
developed a doctrine aimed at “protecting” arbitrators who—lacking the 
same institutional protections as judges—might be susceptible to outside 
 
62. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  By allowing the federal judiciary to enforce valid arbitration agreements, 
this section enacted the overriding principle for the FAA’s drafting.  See supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
63. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–10. 
64. 9 U.S.C. § 11. 
65. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 246. 
66. 9 U.S.C. § 10; Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 248; see Hayford, supra note 2, at 450 
(“Nothing in section 10(a) . . . authorizes the courts to engage in substantive review of the 
merits . . . of . . . arbitration awards.”); Hayford, supra note 36, at 117 (“On its face, Section 10(a) 
does not sanction judicial inquiry of any sort into the merits of . . . arbitration awards.”). 
67. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (describing two separate grounds for vacatur “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon 
the subject matter was not made”). 
68. Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1980). 
69. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1110 (citing Conn. Tech. Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ. 
Props., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 80 (explaining 
that under § 10 an arbitrator “must provide the parties with a ruling that resolves the dispute”). 
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pressures to revisit awards.70  Latin for “task performed” or “office 
performed,” the doctrine came to be known as functus officio.71 
The Supreme Court defined the common-law rule in its 1863 decision 
Bayne v. Morris72 as follows: “Arbitrators exhaust their power when they 
make a final determination on the matters submitted to them.  They have no 
power after having made an award to alter it; the authority conferred on 
them is then at an end.”73  Judge Richard Posner explained the doctrine 
further: 
The doctrine is based on the analogy of a judge who resigns his office and, having done 
so, naturally cannot rule on a request to reconsider or amend his decision.  Arbitrators are 
ad hoc judges—judges for a case; and when the case is over they cease to be judges and 
go back to being law professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in private life, 
like Cincinnatus returning to his plow.  The flaw in the analogy is that the judge’s 
resignation does not deprive litigants of an opportunity to seek reconsideration of his 
decisions.  Motions to reconsider are simply directed to another judge.  If the 
“resignation” of the arbitrator from the case, in accordance with the doctrine of functus 
officio, disables him from considering a motion for reconsideration, clarification, 
amendment, or other modification, there is nobody to whom the parties can turn.  The 
result would be a gap in the system of arbitral justice that would make very little sense 
that we can see.  Not no sense.  Once they return to private life, arbitrators are less 
sheltered than sitting judges, and it is feared that disappointed parties will bombard them 
with ex parte communications and that the arbitrators, not being professional judges or 
subject to the constraints of judicial ethics, will yield. . . .74 
Simply put, the doctrine bars arbitrators from reexamining the merits of a 
dispute once they have issued an award.75 
At first glance, such a bar to reexamination seems to promote the 
finality of arbitration.76  However, denying arbitrators the ability to revisit 
awards allows uncertainties to foster, thereby actually producing greater 
fodder for litigation, reducing arbitral finality, and reducing arbitration’s 
 
70. Official & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union, Local No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d 
326, 331 (3d Cir. 1999). See Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union, Local 
182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 845 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“The doctrine 
originated in the bad old days when judges were hostile to arbitration and ingenious at hamstringing 
it. It is said to have been ‘nourished by the primitive view of the solemnity of all judgments.’”) 
(quoting La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) (internal 
citations omitted). 
71. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331; Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 845. 
72. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97 (1863). 
73. Bayne, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 99. 
74. Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 846–47. 
75. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331 (citing Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 
991 (3d Cir. 1997)); Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 845 (“The arbitrator has performed his office and 
having done so has been discharged from it.”). 
76. See La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) (referring 
to functus officio as a “policy of finality”). 
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utility. 77  Thus, as judicial hostility to arbitration tempered and the common 
law continued to develop, exceptions were carved out of the general doctrine 
of functus officio.78  The Third Circuit recognized three particular exceptions 
to the doctrine, including allowing arbitrators to correct an apparent error, to 
render an award on a missed issue, and to clarify an ambiguity.79 
These exceptions do not jeopardize the award’s finality because they do 
“not in any way violate any policy relating to arbitration and would be 
within the arbitrators’ power to pursue on their own motion.”80  Awards 
containing ambiguities only provide greater uncertainty and therefore fodder 
for litigation, increasing the likelihood for de novo judicial review.81  In 
essence, the exceptions do not harm finality because the judge seeks 
guidance for enforcement of the award rather than examining the merits of 
the decision itself.  On the other hand, by its very nature, the opportunity for 
arbitrators to correct their awards creates a separate by-product antithetical 
to the arbitration bargain: delay. 
D.  The Development of Manifest Disregard as a Non-statutory Ground for 
Vacatur 
Manifest disregard of law traces its roots to the Supreme Court’s 1953 
decision in Wilko v. Swan.82  The decision involved the invalidation of an 
arbitration agreement under the Securities Acts of 1933.83  Although not 
pertaining directly to the Court’s decision, some lower courts grabbed onto 
specific language stated in dictum: 
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the 
provisions of the Securities Act would “constitute grounds for vacating the award 
pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,” (citation omitted) that failure 
 
77. Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d at 847. 
78. Id. at 846 (“Today, riddled with exceptions, it is hanging on by its fingernails . . . .”). 
79. Brownsville, 186 F.3d at 331 (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 
F.2d 327, 332 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
80. La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573. 
81. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1269 (“To now subject these 
decisions to de novo review would destroy the finality for which the parties contracted and render 
the exhaustive arbitration process merely a prelude to the judicial litigation which the parties sought 
to avoid.”). 
82. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by, Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
83. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.  For an expansive discussion of the Wilko decision see Galbraith, 
supra note 40, at 248–50. 
13
Brown: “Final” Awards Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the Hall S
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 338 
would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted [agreements to arbitrate] . . . the 
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disregard[,] are not 
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.84 
The Court subsequently overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.85  Despite the Court’s rejection of the “old 
judicial hostility to arbitration,” which it found pervaded the Wilko 
opinion,86 the Court’s Wilko dicta has managed to endure.87 
Evolving almost exclusively in the lower courts, manifest disregard has 
not received much attention from the Supreme Court.88  In fact, prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, the Court had only mentioned 
manifest disregard three times.89  Among those mentions, the Court’s most 
“glowing” endorsement came in the form of parenthetical dicta.90  Despite 
the Wilko statement’s lack of precedential value, it nonetheless helped to 
prompt the widespread adoption of manifest disregard by the lower courts.91 
The most common approach to the doctrine came from the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker. 92  
The Bobker approach essentially entails three parts: (1) the clear existence of 
a governing law, (2) where the arbitrator knew of the controlling law, and 
(3) yet the arbitrator “consciously disregarded or ignored the applicable 
law.”93   Despite the generality of this approach, the numerous circuit court 
 
84. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)); see 
MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado about Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard 
after Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 414 (2010) (“Some lower courts latched on to the Wilko 
language and adopted the doctrine of manifest disregard . . . .”). 
85. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
86. Id. at 480. 
87. See Hayford, supra note 36, at 122 (“The broad acceptance of the ‘manifest disregard’ of 
the law ground by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals demonstrates they do not question its 
legitimacy and continued viability.”). 
88. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 414. For an extensive discussion of the development of 
lower court approaches to manifest disregard, see Hayford, supra note 36, at 122-24; Galbraith, 
supra note 40, at 250–54. 
89. Hayford, supra note 36, at 121–22 n.23. 
90. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilco v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953)) (“[P]arties [are] bound by arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ 
of the law.”); see Hayford, supra note 36, at 121–22 n.23 (dismissively describing this Kaplan 
mention as simply “a parenthetical phrase in dictum”). 
91. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 414. 
92. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986). 
93. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 413 (citing Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
548 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)); see Merrill Lynch, 
808 F.2d  at 933 (“The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly 
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as arbitrator. Moreover, the term ‘disregard’ 
implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides 
to ignore or pay no attention to it.”). 
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opinions applying a manifest disregard standard have failed to advance a 
unitary, clearly articulated, and easily replicated mode of analysis.94 
A critical reason for this failure turns on whether an arbitrator has 
merely misinterpreted the law or manifestly disregarded it.95  As the Court 
stated in Wilko, “the arbitrator’s conception of the legal meaning 
of . . . statutory requirements . . . cannot be examined,” because, 
“interpretations of the law by the arbitrators . . . are not subject . . . to 
judicial review for error in interpretation.”96  As Judge James Oakes 
pondered, “How courts are to distinguish in the Supreme Court’s phrase 
between ‘erroneous interpretation’ of a statute, or for that matter, a clause in 
a contract, and ‘manifest disregard’ of it, we do not know: one man’s 
‘interpretation’ may be another’s ‘disregard.’  Is an ‘irrational’ 
misinterpretation a ‘manifest disregard’?”97  Without bright guidelines, 
courts and parties are left to determine the outer boundaries of the manifest 
disregard standard on their own.  Moreover, because arbitrators often have 
no obligation to make formal findings of fact or to offer a rationale, courts 
can speculate about whether arbitrators have manifestly disregarded an 
applicable law or simply misinterpreted it.98  This, in effect, leaves the court 
to “divine [the] arbitral state of mind.”99 
Under such an amorphous standard, judicial review of the merits of 
arbitral decisions becomes a clear possibility in spite of its total exclusion 
from FAA § 10.  Where manifest disregard allows courts to perform a de 
novo review without recognizing it as such, the doctrine is inconsistent with 
modern arbitration law.100  The primary reason for this inconsistency lies in 
 
94. Hayford, supra note 36, at 122. 
95. Courts do not disagree that manifest disregard should remain a narrow standard. Rather, 
the doctrine’s ambiguity and variance pertains to where, exactly, the line exists between 
misinterpretation of law and manifest disregard of it. See, e.g., Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 
680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[Manifest disregard] cannot empower a District Court to conduct the 
same de novo review of questions of law than an appellate court exercises over lower court 
decisions. Indeed, we have in the past held that ‘it is clear that [manifest disregard] means more than 
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.’” (quoting Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 949 
F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
96. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953). 
97. I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974). 
98. Galbraith, supra note 40, at 260. 
99. Hayford, supra note 36, at 135. 
100. Baravati v. Josephtal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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manifest disregard’s plain incompatibility with the finality of arbitration.101  
Simply put, manifest disregard frustrates the arbitration agreement and the 
benefit of its bargain.102 
II. HALL STREET ASSOCIATES AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court sought to resolve a split among 
the circuit courts over the viability of expanded judicial review of arbitral 
awards by contract.103  By contracting for judicial review, parties to an 
arbitration agreement ask for the vacatur of arbitral awards that do not 
conform to legal standards agreed to in the arbitration agreement.104  
However, in resolving the split, the Court in Hall Street raised new questions 
regarding judicial review of arbitral awards.105  These questions have led to a 
new circuit split over whether manifest disregard remains a valid ground for 
vacatur of arbitral awards.106 
A. The Decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. and the 
New Circuit Split 
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that parties could not contract for 
expanded judicial review because FAA §§ 10 and 11 are the exclusive 
grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitral awards.107  The parties at 
issue in Hall Street agreed to arbitrate a dispute over an indemnification 
claim, which had remained unresolved after a bench trial of a landlord-
tenant dispute.108  The parties included a clause in their arbitration agreement 
which stated that the district court “shall vacate, modify or correct any 
award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by 
substantial evidence or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are 
 
101. Hayford, supra note 36, at 118 (“[Manifest disregard] rob[s] the [arbitration] process of its 
most essential feature—finality—by giving parties disappointed with the result reached in arbitration 
reason to believe they may be able to circumvent objectionable awards by resort to the courts.”). 
102. See Galbraith, supra note 40, at 259 (“[P]roviding grounds for vacation outside the 
Federal Arbitration Act . . . frustrates the intent of the parties who bargained for the arbitration 
process to resolve their disputes.”). 
103. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 745. 
104. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1117. 
105. Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review 
of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 938 (2010); Gronlund, supra note 3, at 1363. 
106. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1; Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 424; Gronlund, supra note 3, 
at 1363. 
107. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008). 
108. Id. at 579. 
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erroneous.”109  When the arbitral award—decided in favor of defendant 
Mattel—stated that Mattel owed no indemnification because the Oregon 
Drinking Water Quality Act did not apply to the terms of the lease, plaintiff 
Hall Street Associates filed a motion for vacatur on the ground that this 
exclusion constituted legal error.110  The district court agreed and vacated the 
award, remanding it to the arbitrator.111  On remand, the arbitrator applied 
the Oregon Act and reversed his decision.112  Following an extremely 
complicated subsequent procedural history, the Supreme Court ultimately 
granted review.113 
Although the question before the Court specifically pertained to the 
viability of contractually expanded judicial review,114 the Court also 
responded to Hall Street’s argument that the Court’s Wilko decision 
expanded the possibilities for judicial review beyond sections 10 and 11.115  
Hall Street argued that the Wilko dicta—from which the doctrine of manifest 
disregard derived116—showed that sections 10 and 11 could not be the 
exclusive grounds for vacatur because manifest disregard was a further non-
statutory ground.117 
In response, the Court rejected Hall Street’s argument because the 
vagueness of the Wilko language did not support such a construction.118  The 
Court rooted its rejection on the grounds that Hall Street asked the Court to 
do exactly what the Wilko Court had refused—to find that arbitral awards 
may be reviewed for general legal error.119  Next, the Court displayed its 
uneasiness with manifest disregard by stating that “[m]aybe the term 
‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe 
it merely referred to the section 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 580. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id.   For an in depth discussion of the facts and the complicated procedural history of Hall 
Street, see Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 770–71. 
114. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581.  For the specific question upon which the Court granted 
certiorari, see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
115. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 581. 
116. See supra Part I.C. 
117. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584. 
118. See id. at 585 (“Hall Street sees this supposed addition [of manifest disregard] to § 10 as 
the camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties.  But 
this is too much for Wilko to bear.”). 
119. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1119–20. 
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to them.”120  The Court never definitively resolved this issue, instead 
confining its discussion of manifest disregard to dicta by simply concluding 
that “when speaking as a Court, [we] have merely taken the Wilko language 
as we found it, without embellishment, and now that its meaning is 
implicated, we see no reason to accord it the significance that Hall Street 
urges.” 121  Accordingly, this language seemed to cast doubt on the continued 
validity of manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground without 
emphatically denouncing the doctrine.122  Since Hall Street, the circuit courts 
have grappled with the question, disagreeing over whether or not manifest 
disregard remains a valid ground for vacatur.123 
B. Manifest Disregard Does Not Survive as a Valid Ground for Vacatur in 
the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
Several courts have concluded that Hall Street sounded the death knell 
for manifest disregard.124  Most significantly, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have conclusively held that manifest disregard did not survive Hall 
Street as a valid ground for vacatur under the FAA.125  Additionally, the First 
Circuit indicated in a footnote that if the question presented itself, the Court 
would likely agree and formally abolish manifest disregard.126 
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that “Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in 
section 10 of the . . . [FAA], and consequently, manifest disregard of the law 
is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the 
FAA.” 127  The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s vacatur of an award 
when the panel of arbitrators intentionally did not follow a state law in 
 
120. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 585. 
121. Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)). 
122. See Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 770 (“After roughly fifty years of continuous use by 
the federal courts, manifest disregard was called into question by the United States Supreme Court in 
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.”). 
123. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 1; Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 424; Gronlund, supra note 3, 
at 1363. 
124. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 3 (“There are currently two broad schools of thought on the 
issue. The first is that Hall Street spells the end of manifest disregard and, by implication, any other 
non-statutory vacatur ground.”) (footnote omitted). 
125. Weston, supra note 105, at 940. 
126. Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We acknowledge the 
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Hall Street that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid 
ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the Federal Arbitration 
Act.”) (citation omitted). But see Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 
2010) (declining to definitively answer the question as to whether manifest disregard had “continued 
vitality . . . in FAA proceedings”). 
127. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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reaching its decision.128  The Citigroup court found that Hall Street 
unequivocally left the statutory grounds under section 10 as the exclusive 
avenue to vacatur under the FAA.129  Since the Fifth Circuit’s precedent had 
categorized manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground, the court reasoned 
that it could no longer use manifest disregard as a basis for vacating 
awards.130 
In Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit’s Citigroup rationale for discarding manifest disregard.131  The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion 
for vacatur or modification.132  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the 
district court should not have confirmed the award on the ground that the 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.133  Like the Fifth Circuit before it, 
the Eleventh Circuit found the language of Hall Street compelling, stating 
that “our judicially-created bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light of 
Hall Street.”134 
In Medicine Shoppe International, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., the 
Eighth Circuit became the third of the circuit courts to officially reject the 
manifest disregard doctrine.  Like the Eleventh Circuit in Frazier, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion for vacatur.135  The 
Medicine Shoppe court first held that under Hall Street, courts may vacate 
arbitral awards only for the reasons outlined in section 10.136  Accordingly, 
the court determined that the ground alleged in the motion for vacatur was 
not among those listed in § 10 and therefore was not allowable.137 
C. Manifest Disregard Survived Hall Street as a Statutory Ground for 
Vacatur in the Seventh, Second and Ninth Circuits 
Several circuit courts have concluded that manifest disregard survived 
following the Hall Street decision as a so-called judicial gloss for review 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 355. 
130. Id. 
131. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1321. 
134. Id. at 1324. 
135. Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc.,  614 F.3d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 2010). 
136. Id. at 489. 
137. Id. at 489. 
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under FAA § 10(a).138  However, not all of these circuits have come to this 
conclusion in the same manner.  Prior to the decision in Hall Street, the 
Seventh Circuit had already narrowly tailored its manifest disregard doctrine 
to fit under section 10(a)(4).  Then, after the decision in Hall Street, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits attempted to accord their pre-Hall Street 
precedents with the Seventh Circuit’s narrowly defined statutory 
construction of manifest disregard. 
1. The Seventh Circuit and Its Pre-Hall Street Statutory Construction 
In 2001, the Seventh Circuit decided George Watts & Son, Inc. v. 
Tiffany & Co., in which the court affirmed a district court’s denial of a 
motion for vacatur.139  In the decision, Judge Frank Easterbrook questioned 
whether any overriding principles existed that would authorize courts to 
review the legal underpinnings—whether written or unwritten—of 
arbitrators’ decisions.140  After considering whether manifest disregard could 
mean something akin to review for clear error, the court determined it could 
not. 141  Judge Easterbrook concluded that the “‘manifest disregard’ principle 
is limited to two possibilities: an arbitral order requiring the parties to violate 
the law . . . and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal principles 
specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under [FAA] § 10(a).”142  In 
other words, the Seventh Circuit confined manifest disregard to two specific 
instances, in which the award contained an inherent bar to enforcement.143 
Five years later, Judge Posner took the next logical step in Wise v. 
Wachovia Securities LLC, affirmatively confining manifest disregard of law 
to situations which “fit[] comfortably under the first clause of the fourth 
statutory ground [of § 10(a)]—‘where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers.’”144  By following Judge Easterbrook’s language in George Watts, 
the Wise court differentiated the Seventh Circuit from other circuits that set 
aside arbitral awards based on a non-statutory approach to manifest 
disregard.145  The court then affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion 
 
138. Weston, supra note 105, at 941–42; see Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 
F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
139. George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001). 
140. Id. at 579. 
141. Id. at 580. 
142. Id. at 581. 
143. Id. 
144. Wise v. Wachovia Securities LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 2006). 
145. Id. at 268–69. 
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for vacatur, and Judge Posner directed the parties to the statutory grounds for 
vacatur as the exclusive grounds for review.146 
Although some have characterized Wise as embracing a more expansive 
interpretation of section 10(a)(4),147 it is more appropriately considered as a 
narrower conception of manifest disregard, since the Seventh Circuit 
“confined [manifest disregard] to cases in which arbitrators ‘direct the 
parties to violate the law.’”148  In other words, without more than just willful 
indifference to applicable law present, the Seventh Circuit will not find 
manifest disregard.149  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit became the first of 
the circuit courts to limit manifest disregard to a statutory ground under 
section 10(a)(4).150 
2. The Second and Ninth Circuits’ Post-Hall Street Rebranding of 
Manifest Disregard 
Following the Supreme Court’s language regarding manifest disregard 
in Hall Street, two circuit courts agreed at least nominally with the approach 
of the Seventh Circuit and attempted to fit their manifest disregard doctrines 
under the statutory umbrella.  Namely, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
asserted that manifest disregard survived Hall Street as shorthand for 
analysis under section 10(a)(4).151 
In Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Second 
Circuit held that Hall Street “did not . . . abrogate the ‘manifest disregard’ 
doctrine altogether.”152  Where the arbitrator had permitted class arbitration 
despite the arbitration agreement’s silence on the matter, the district court 
vacated the award because the arbitrator did not perform a meaningful 
 
146. Id. at 269. 
147. Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 427 (internal quotations omitted). 
148. Wise, 450 F.3d at 269 (quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 
580 (7th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). 
149. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 12. 
150. See Aragaki, supra note 4, at 4 n.25 (“Even prior to Hall Street, the Seventh Circuit had 
reinterpreted manifest disregard as a statutory, rather than a common law, doctrine.”) (citing George 
Watts, 248 F.3d at 581); Sims & Bales, supra note 84, at 427 (“The Seventh Circuit is the only 
circuit that did not view manifest disregard as a non-statutory ground for review prior to Hall 
Street.”). 
151. Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 777. 
152. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on 
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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choice-of-law analysis.153  Agreeing in principle with the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach to manifest disregard, the Stolt-Nielsen court reversed the district 
court’s vacatur.154 
The Second Circuit laid out its new statutory conception of manifest 
disregard as a sort of progeny of the Seventh Circuit’s, in which the court 
bore a responsibility to vacate awards in which the arbitrator “willfully 
flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.”155  In this situation, the 
court reasoned, the arbitrators did not interpret the contract at all and thereby 
exceeded their powers under section 10(a)(4).156  The crux of the court’s 
argument revolved around the assertion that “parties do not agree in advance 
to submit to arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the 
law.”157  Accordingly, manifest disregard review has maintained a continued 
viability in the Second Circuit. 
Similarly, in Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,158 the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a corresponding approach, stating that Hall Street did not 
undermine prior precedent, and as a result, manifest disregard retains 
continued validity as a ground for vacatur under section 10(a)(4).159  Not 
wholly dissimilar to Hall Street, Comedy Club involved a complicated 
procedural history, including vacation and remand by the Supreme Court for 
a decision in accordance with Hall Street.160  The Comedy Club court 
vacated part of a district court’s order confirming an arbitral award.161  
Reasoning that the arbitrator had neither the power to bind nonparties to the 
agreement by a permanent injunction nor to enforce a nationwide in-term 
covenant not to compete—both in “manifest disregard” of California 
Business and Professions Code (CBPC) section 16600—the Ninth Circuit 
held that the arbitrator exceeded his power under section 10(a)(4).162  
Consequently, like the Second Circuit, manifest disregard review continues 
in the Ninth Circuit through a nomenclature of statutory construction. 
 
153. Id. at 89–90 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
154. Id. at 95. 
155. Id. (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). 
159. Id. at 1281. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1287–94. 
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D. Manifest Disregard Lingers as a Nonstatutory Ground for Vacatur in 
the Sixth Circuit 
In Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.,163 an unpublished opinion 
decided in 2008, the Sixth Circuit left its pre-Hall Street precedent 
“untouched.”164  In order to do so, the Coffee Beanery court narrowly 
construed the holding in Hall Street, stating that the decision did not 
foreclose judicial review for arbitral manifest disregard.165  Reasoning that 
because the Supreme Court failed to definitively resolve Wilko’s meaning, 
the Court’s holding pertained only to contractual supplements by private 
parties. 166  As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated the award because the 
arbitrator did not apply a Maryland franchise law in a dispute arising out of a 
franchise agreement.167  The franchise law had required the disclosure of a 
specific class of felony convictions.168  However, the arbitrator concluded 
that the franchisor’s failure to disclose a grand larceny conviction was 
immaterial because the franchise law did not contemplate that particular 
felony. 169  The court disagreed, finding that the award displayed the 
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of applicable law.170 
This case is reminiscent of the tension between an arbitrator merely 
misinterpreting a law or manifestly disregarding it.171  On the one hand, the 
arbitrator interpreted that the felony was not of the variety contemplated by 
the statute’s disclosure requirement.172  On the other, as the Sixth Circuit 
pointed out, the arbitrator probably should have found the failure to disclose 
material, since the statute required the disclosure of “any person identified in 
 
163. 300 F. App 415 (6th Cir. 2008). 
164. Annie Chen, Note, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law after Hall Street: 
Implications for Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts, 32 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1872, 1892 (2009); see Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 419 (“[T]his Court will follow its well-
established precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’ standard.”).  In a 
subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit has apparently “retreated” slightly from its conclusion in 
Coffee Beanery.  Aragaki, supra note 44, at 5 n.33.  See Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health 
Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2008). 
165. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 418. 
166. Id. at 418–19. 
167. Id. at 421. 
168. Id. at 420. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 419. 
171. See supra Part I.C. 
172. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App at 420. 
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the prospectus [who] has been convicted of a felony . . . if the felony or civil 
action involved fraud, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or 
misappropriation of property.”173  Grand larceny certainly qualifies as a 
misappropriation of property.174  Regardless, the tension persists because, as 
Judge Oakes presciently stated, “one man’s ‘interpretation’ may be another’s 
‘disregard.’”175 
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT 
In order to resolve the split, the Court can consider doing two things.  
First, siding with the circuits that have already discarded manifest disregard, 
the doctrine should officially be abolished, and the contents of section 10 
should be recognized as the exclusive grounds for vacatur under the FAA.  
Second, by reconceptualizing “final” as it appears in section 10(a)(4), lower 
courts will have the tools to review arbitral awards while expressly 
abstaining from a de novo review on the merits.  This method allows courts 
to review arbitral awards following the text of the FAA without disturbing 
the integrity of the benefit of the arbitration bargain. 
A. Manifest Disregard Does Not “Fit” Under the FAA 
Examining the history of the FAA, it becomes clear that the drafters 
never envisioned the enforcement of illegal or unconscionable awards.176  
Over time, however, this understanding has eroded, and courts have sought 
increasing supervision of the arbitral process.177  As Professor Carbonneau 
notes, pressure to change the arbitral process and provide greater protection 
to individual rights has led to a variety of nonstatutory and common law 
grounds for vacatur, including the use of unconscionability, actions to clarify 
awards, and contract provisions that allow enhanced judicial review.178  
Among common law grounds, the ambiguous and subjective manifest 
disregard standard provides another potential for review that the drafters of 
 
173. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 14-216(8)(i)). 
174. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. § 14-216(8)(i)). 
175. I/S Stavborg v. Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974). 
176. See Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“The courts are bound to accept and enforce the 
award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common 
morality, it ought not to be enforced.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273. While the 
legislative history of the FAA is admittedly limited in scope, this language clearly indicates that the 
statute never envisioned the enforcement of illegal awards or awards that might shock the 
conscience. 
177. Carbonneau, supra note 55, at 241–42. 
178. Id. 
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the FAA did not envision—a technical review of arbitral awards on their 
merits. 179  Congress enacted the FAA to abrogate the old common law 
doctrines hostile to arbitration agreements; manifest disregard should 
likewise be invalidated as a remnant of the same ancient judicial hostility.180 
To begin with, as illustrated above, manifest disregard as a nonstatutory 
ground for vacatur obviates the bargained-for benefits of an arbitration 
agreement.181  If manifest disregard survived Hall Street as such, then the 
doctrine should be abolished on these grounds alone. However, if “manifest 
disregard” is now simply shorthand for analysis under FAA § 10(a)(4) then 
it is confusing and unnecessary.  Judge Posner made just this point in 
Baravati: “If [manifest disregard] is intended to be synonymous with the 
statutory formula that it most nearly resembles . . . it is superfluous and 
confusing.  There is enough confusion in the law.  The grounds for setting 
aside arbitration awards are exhaustively stated in the statute.”182  Indeed, the 
ambiguity and confusion inherent in any manifest disregard analysis means 
that the terms’ use alone creates the possibility for “back door” review of 
arbitral awards on their merits.183 
Next, manifest disregard as defined by the Second Circuit in Stolt-
Nielsen and the Ninth Circuit in Comedy Club does not meet the definition 
of arbitral excess of authority under FAA section 10(a)(4).  Under the 
traditional definition, arbitrators exceed their powers when they decide 
issues not submitted to arbitration or when the arbitrators decline to follow 
principles of adjudication set out in the agreement to arbitrate.184  In 2011, 
 
179. Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“There is no authority and no opportunity for the 
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been.”); 
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (same); but cf. id. (emphasizing the importance of courts 
“refus[ing] to permit the invasion of technicalities in the application of the law or the determination 
of rights under it”). 
180. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1110. 
181. See supra Parts I.A, C. 
182. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
183. For this reason, statements which include manifest disregard as a tool to enforce 
arbitration agreements rather than review them should be viewed with skepticism.  See, e.g., 
Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, No. 10-2111, 2012 WL 507022, at *8 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2012) 
(“Whether manifest disregard is a “judicial gloss” or an independent ground for vacatur, it is not an 
invitation to review the merits of the underlying arbitration.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e view the ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine, and the 
FAA itself, as a mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial 
review of the arbitrators’ decision.”) 
184. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2009); Hayford, supra 
note 2, at 455–56; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1109 (“Arbitrators exceed their powers when they issue 
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the Second Circuit defined arbitral excess of authority along these traditional 
lines in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc,185 stating that “an arbitrator may 
exceed her authority by, first, considering issues beyond those the parties 
have submitted for her consideration, or, second, reaching issues clearly 
prohibited by law or by the terms of the parties’ agreement.”186 
Additionally, an excess of arbitral power occurs when an arbitrator or 
tribunal is not constituted in accordance to the terms of the arbitration 
agreement.187  Since arbitration depends on party consent through the 
arbitration agreement, parties confer the power to settle disputes through the 
terms of their agreement.188  When the appointment of an arbitrator or 
tribunal does not follow these terms, decision-making power does not confer 
upon the arbitral tribunal.189  Accordingly, although an arbitrator may 
determine certain issues that affect the arbitrator’s power to make an 
award,190 an award will not be enforced if the arbitrator’s selection does not 
follow the parties’ agreed-upon method.191  Where the parties have not 
conferred the power to enter an award, the pure act of rendering one exceeds 
the arbitrator’s powers. 
Accepting these definitions, a problem pervades the Second and Ninth 
Circuits’ conceptualizations of excess of authority.  Namely, manifest 
disregard situations often involve the decision of either a properly appointed 
or constituted arbitrator or tribunal in which the award expressly confines 
itself to the issues submitted by the parties.  For example, in Comedy Club 
the Ninth Circuit vacated an award on the basis of manifest disregard where 
 
an award on an issue not presented to them in the submission to arbitration, or when they fail to 
adhere to other constraining criteria prescribed by the parties, such as arbitration rules that the parties 
may have drafted into their arbitration provisions . . . .”); accord H. ARTHUR DUNN & HENRY P. 
DIMOND, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: BEING A COMPILATION OF AWARDS OF ARBITRATION 
COMMITTEES OF VARIOUS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 20 (1922) (“The submission [to arbitration] creates the special jurisdiction of the arbitrators, 
and the award necessarily must conform thereto, else it not be considered valid.”). 
185. 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011). 
186. Id. at 122. 
187. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 92 
(2d Cir. 2005) (“Under the FAA, an award issued by arbitrators who are not appointed in accordance 
with agreed-upon procedures may be vacated because the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’”). 
188. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
189. Id. (“The defect in the method used to select [the arbitrator] left him powerless to 
implement the . . . Agreement.”). 
190. An example of such a situation includes the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, under 
which an arbitrator or tribunal has the ability or “competence” to determine its own jurisdiction.  See 
Natasha Wyss, Note, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (1997). 
191. 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (1997) (citing Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th 
Cir.1977)). 
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the award resolved only issues submitted to the arbitrator.192  The Comedy 
Club court vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his power by 
enjoining nonparties to the agreement and enforcing an overly broad in-term 
covenant not to compete.193  However, the arbitrator bound nonparties to the 
agreement by employing the term “affiliate” as defined in the underlying 
contract and enforcing the covenant as found in the contract. 194  Where an 
award uses the contract’s definition of a term and enforces a covenant as it 
appears in the contract, both on issues submitted for determination, the 
arbitrator has by definition remained within his or her delegated authority 
under the arbitration agreement.195 
The Second Circuit attempted to correct this inconsistency when it 
asserted that, “[P]arties do not agree in advance to submit to arbitration that 
is carried out in manifest disregard of the law.”196  This assertion seems to 
discount the reality that any error of law could potentially be deemed 
manifest disregard, since litigants will never expressly grant an arbitrator the 
power to make a mistake.197  The court simply ignores the fact that the 
parties delegated the authority to decide the case to an arbitrator rather than a 
judge, and as such, the parties have assumed the risk that the arbitrator might 
decide incorrectly.198  In addition, as frequently occurs, “submissions to 
arbitration . . . do not call for the arbitrator to apply [a specific] law.”199  
Within the context of these “general” submissions to arbitration, the 
Second Circuit’s own Jock definition of excess of authority undermines its 
 
192. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1287-94 (9th Cir. 2009); see 
supra Part II.C.2. 
193. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1283. 
194. Id. at 1286–89. 
195. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“As long as the 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious errors does not suffice to overturn his 
decision.”); but cf. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1109 (“For cases in which the decision is not drawn 
from the essence of the contract, Section 10(a)(4) provides an adequate remedy—not because the 
awards are . . . irrational, but because they exceed the scope of the authority’s authority since the 
award is not drawn from the essence of the contract that the arbitrator has been authorized to 
interpret by the parties.”). 
196. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on 
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
197. William W. Park, The Four Musketeers of Arbitral Duty, in IS ARBITRATION ONLY AS 
GOOD AS THE ARBITRATOR? STATUS, POWERS AND ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR 33 (ICC Dossiers, 
Vol. 8 No. 1, 2011). 
198. Park, supra note 188. 
199. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1147. 
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Stolt-Nielsen argument that parties do not agree in advance to manifest 
disregard.  When parties do not specify a law to which the arbitral analysis 
must adhere, arbitrators may commit errors of law without rendering a 
decision unauthorized by the parties, so long as the arbitrators only decide 
issues submitted to them.200  In such a situation, the arbitrators have not 
exceeded their authority to make the determination.201  Professor Reuben 
takes this point one step further: 
Because the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, it makes little sense to evaluate 
the arbitrator’s decision on the basis of how well it complies with the law. Indeed, if the 
arbitral decision is not based on law and is instead based on some other norm, such as 
industry custom or practice, manifest disregard effectively constitutes a substitution of 
judgment by the court for the decision of the arbitrator.202 
By holding an arbitrator to a legal construction where the parties have not 
specified these or any other guidelines in their agreement, courts effectively 
vitiate the arbitrator’s bargained-for determination.203 
As a result, review for manifest disregard of law does not fit into FAA 
section 10(a)(4) review for an arbitrator’s excess of authority.204  
Additionally, these courts have not in reality changed their manifest 
disregard analysis to adapt to the new statutory configuration under 
section 10(a)(4).205  Scholars and practitioners alike have found this doctrinal 
approach troubling.206  Affixing the label “dog” to a cat does not suddenly 
make the animal a canine. 
Furthermore, looking at section 10(a)(4) from a “textualist” approach, 
the subsection differentiates between arbitrators “exceed[ing] their powers” 
and arbitrators “imperfectly execut[ing]” those powers.207  By separating 
these two possible rationales with a comma and “or,” the statute makes clear 
 
200. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2011). 
201. Id. 
202. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1149. 
203. Cf. id. at 1147 (“Manifest disregard has no place in the modern structure of arbitration for 
general submissions to arbitration . . . .”). 
204. Aragaki, supra note 4, at 10; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1144 (“[M]anifest disregard review 
should not be viewed as synonymous with exceeding-power review.”). 
205. See supra Part II.C.2. 
206. See e.g., Aragaki, supra note 4, at 10 (“[T]he statutory approach invites doctrinal 
complications.  One such complication may arise because courts have largely continued to use pre-
Hall Street manifest disregard precedents without questioning whether they are appropriate in a 
statutory manifest disregard regime.”); Christopher Walsh, Stolt-Nielsen’s Comfort for the “Average 
Arbitrator”: An Analysis of the Post-Hall Street “Manifest Disregard” Award Review Standard, 27 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 19, 21 (2009) (finding it “troubling” that “the Second Circuit 
continues to apply the doctrine as it was developed before Hall Street when it was considered by the 
Second Circuit to be an extrastatutory basis for vacatur”). 
207. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
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that the grounds exist distinct from one another.208  The Second Circuit’s 
attempt to grandfather its pre-Hall Street manifest disregard law into a post-
Hall Street statutory regime improperly combines the two distinct grounds, 
further perpetuating the confused and muddled conception of vacatur under 
section 10(a)(4).  Accordingly, in the words of Professor Reuben, “the ghost 
of manifest disregard” should be laid to rest.209 
B. Reconceptualizing a “Final” Award Under Section 10(a)(4) 
The traditional views of the finality of arbitral awards fall short of the 
fundamental nature of arbitration, finality as interpreted in the international 
context, and the intentions of the FAA’s drafters.210  Consequently, courts 
have sought to expand and define their roles in policing arbitral awards 
through means such as manifest disregard of the law.211  This 
reconceptualization seeks to remedy the shortcomings by envisioning a two-
step process.  First, enforceability must be considered as a criteria of a 
“final” award under section 10(a)(4).212  Next, the use of section 11(c) 
should be expanded to include instances where a court determines that an 
award does not meet the requirement of enforceability, but modifying the 
terms of the award will not disturb its merits.  By reconceptualizing the 
procedure for enforcing and modifying awards, courts will have at least the 
superficial control over arbitral awards they crave, but in a manner that 
excludes reviewing the merits of the decision. 
1. A “Final” Award Under Section 10(a)(4) Must Be Enforceable 
FAA section 10(a)(4) allows courts to vacate an arbitral award “[w]here 
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
 
208. Id.; accord Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 268 (“[I]f [the arbitrators] exceeded their 
powers or failed to make a mutual, final or definite award, then and then only the award may be 
vacated.”) (emphasis added). 
209. Reuben, supra note 3, at 1146. 
210. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text; see infra Parts I.C & III.B.1. 
211. See supra Part I.D. 
212. Such a construction simply reflects the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that, “[t]he 
federal [arbitration] policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private 
agreements to arbitrate.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 476 (1989). After all, “[t]he private practice of arbitration [is] of little practical use without 
the authority of court enforcement . . . .”  Berger & Sun, supra note 3, at 748. 
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made.” 213  As mentioned, the traditional conceptualization of a “final” award 
under this section has remained largely procedural in nature.214  
Reconceptualization does not seek to change that. Instead, it seeks to expand 
the traditional concept to include and implement the words of Julius Henry 
Cohen, one of the principal drafters of the FAA, when he stated, “[t]he 
judgment so entered [under FAA section 9] is subject to the same provisions 
of law as any other judgment, whether as to enforcement, appeal therefrom, 
or in any other respect.”215  In other words, in order for an arbitral award to 
be considered “final” under section 10(a)(4), the award must be enforceable 
in the same manner as any public judgment. 
As previously noted, the drafters of the FAA did not consider the 
possibility that courts would enforce illegal or immoral arbitral awards under 
the putative authority of the FAA.216  Under this reconceptualization, if a 
court cannot enforce an arbitral award on the ground that the award itself 
violates a law, the award is not final; if a court refuses to enforce an award 
on other public policy grounds, the award is not final.217  By adding 
“enforceability” to the traditional conceptualization of “final,” the Seventh 
Circuit’s definition of manifest disregard fits nicely under section 10(a)(4) 
without requiring the confused designation of manifest disregard as 
shorthand or judicial gloss.  Thus, courts will put into effect Judge Posner’s 
 
213. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
214. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing that the parties’ dispute must be 
resolved to such an extent that they need not litigate further to finalize their obligations).  
Additionally, judicial interpretation of “final” has been said to track the “final judgment rule,” which 
denies appellate review of interlocutory appeals.  Jennifer M. Rhodes, Judicial Review of Partial 
Arbitral Awards Under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 663, 664 
(2003).  For a broad examination and discussion of judicial interpretation of section 10(a)(4) “final” 
paralleling the final judgment rule, see generally id. 
215. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 269 (emphasis added). 
216. See Joint Hearings, supra note 56, at 36 (“The courts are bound to accept and enforce the 
award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common 
morality, it ought not to be enforced.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (same). 
217. For examples of arbitral awards which courts do not enforce on public policy grounds, see 
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1141–43.  Professor Reuben argues for the elimination all nonstatutory or 
common law grounds for vacatur except for those awards vacated on public policy grounds. Reuben, 
supra note 3.  The argument for the continued viability of a public policy exception to § 10(a)’s 
exclusivity sounds remarkably similar to the Seventh Circuit’s narrow statutory definition of 
manifest disregard of the law.  Compare Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(confining manifest disregard to “cases in which arbitrators ‘direct the parties to violate the law”) 
(quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)), with 
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1141–43 (“It seems likely that courts will recognize a public policy 
exception to the seemingly strict rule of Hall Street, at least for illegal arbitration awards.”).  The 
argument for reconceptualization of what constitutes a final award under section 10(a)(4) 
encompasses both Professor Reuben’s exception and the Seventh Circuit’s manifest disregard model, 
making the need for either designation unnecessary. 
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admonition that “[w]e can understand neither the need for the [manifest 
disregard] formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration 
(we suspect none—that it is just words).”218 
2. Section 11(c) as a Tool to Enable Courts to Effect Arbitral Intent 
and Promote Justice Among the Parties 
In instances where courts find arbitral awards unenforceable, the courts 
should have greater leeway to modify the award to make it enforceable.  
Courts should employ this authority under FAA section 11(c) as long as the 
modification does not affect the merits of the award.219  The argument that 
courts should utilize section 11 in conjunction with section 10 finds support 
in two places.  One, the language of both the first and second grounds for 
vacatur under section 10(a)(4) relate to and parallel sections 11(b) and (c), 
respectively.220  Two, the language of section 11 clearly voices its support 
for this proposition. 
The language of sections 10(a)(4) and 11 parallel each other in two 
ways.  First, section 10(a)(4)’s reference to an arbitrator’s excess of 
authority relates directly to authorization of a court to modify under 
section 11(b), in which the arbitrators have decided a matter not in the 
submission to arbitration.221  Although section 11(b) does not use the terms 
“exceeded their powers” or similar constructions, the section nonetheless 
employs the traditional definition of arbitral excess of authority.222  Second, 
sections 10(a)(4) and 11(c) refer to “imperfect[] execut[ion]” and an arbitral 
award as being “imperfect in matter of form” as grounds for vacatur and 
modification, respectively.223  The parallel of both language and concepts 
between these subsections supports their contemplated use in conjunction 
 
218. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
219. FAA section 11(c) allows for an order modifying or correcting an award “[w]here the 
award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.”  9 U.S.C. § 11(c) 
(2006). 
220. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text (describing separate grounds for vacatur 
as flowing from two distinct clauses under section 10(a)(4)). 
221. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (authorizing vacatur “where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers”), with 9 U.S.C. § 11(b) (authorizing modification “[w]here the arbitrators have awarded 
upon a matter not submitted to them”). 
222. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the traditional definition of 
arbitrators exceeding their power as arbitrators issuing awards on issues not submitted for 
determination, or arbitrators failing to follow other constraining criteria prescribed by the parties). 
223. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(4), 11(c). 
31
Brown: “Final” Awards Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the Hall S
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 356 
with one another, or, at worst, that the two sections are not incompatible 
with one another. 
Defining the FAA section’s impetus, section 11 states that the court may 
make an order to “modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent 
thereof and promote justice between the parties.”224  Julius Henry Cohen 
echoed this sentiment, reaffirming its importance within the context of 
section 11.225  Accordingly, courts should utilize section 11—and subsection 
11(c) in particular—as a tool to effect the award’s intent, rather than simply 
as a means to correct typos and miscalculations.226 
The argument for expanded use of section 11(c) as a tool should not 
extend beyond modifications a court can make without affecting the merits 
of the award.  As such, a court should look only to the award itself to 
determine (1) the award’s finality (enforceability) and, (2) only where 
necessary, whether modification will not affect the merits of the decision. To 
accomplish this task, judicial modification made under section 11 should not 
extend beyond accepted contract interpretation techniques. 
Judges interpret a multitude of contracts. 227  There is no reason to 
believe they could not apply the same accepted contract interpretation 
techniques to successfully modify awards without delving into the merits of 
the matter.228  Such methodology would be analogous to the FAA’s 
pronouncement in section 2 that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
 
224. 9 U.S.C. § 11. 
225. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (“Correction or modification is so to be made 
as to effect the intent of the award and to promote justice.”). 
226. Many courts have relegated FAA section 11 to the status of spell-check or calculator, 
correcting miscalculations and other readily apparent errors under the authority of § 11(a).  See 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 9, at 81 (“Under Section Eleven, U.S. federal courts, upon the request of 
one of the parties, have the power to modify or correct awards for inadvertent technical errors that 
might preclude enforcement . . . The errors in question must be ‘evident’ and unrelated to the merits 
of the determination. The provision has not become a source of litigious obfuscation.”). 
227. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 289, 290 (2005) (“We . . . observe that the courts actively engage in the interpretation of 
contracts.  The courts fill gaps in contracts, resolve conflicts and ambiguities in language, and 
sometimes replace the parties’ express terms (such as to permit substitution of material B if a 
problem with A occurs).”) (citation omitted). 
228. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is Contract Interpretation a 
Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 85–86 (2010) 
(describing two different traditions for contract interpretation, the “traditional” view—where “there 
was . . . a notion that deciphering language was a lawyerly function”—and the “modern” view—held 
as a “quest to determine what the parties intended”).  Under the traditional view of contract 
interpretation, analogous to the task of statutory interpretation, the legal question is that of 
construing language.  Id. at 84.  It is within this context that federal judges—who are well-versed in 
contract interpretation—should modify otherwise unenforceable awards and bring them within the 
realm of enforceability. 
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equity for the revocation of any contract.”229  Doing so would keep any 
judicial frolicking to a minimum and within section 11’s stated goal of 
achieving the parties’ intent and promoting justice between them.230  This 
approach also accords with Cohen’s statements that section 11 allows “no 
opportunity for technical procedure.”231  Furthermore, this approach does not 
run afoul of functus officio as the award never returns to the arbitrators, 
while at the same time bearing a striking resemblance to the exceptions 
already carved out of that doctrine.232  By allowing a judge to simply look to 
the award to determine its enforceability, thereby removing the need to 
remand awards back to arbitration for further proceedings, the solution 
plainly promotes efficiency in the total arbitration process. 
The decision in Comedy Club provides the perfect opportunity to 
reconceptualize an analysis under FAA sections 10(a)(4) and 11(c) as well 
as to clarify the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to shoehorn pre-Hall Street manifest 
disregard doctrine into a purported statutory construction. 
C. Resolution in Practice – Comedy Club Reconceptualized 
In deciding Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, the Ninth 
Circuit made two major findings that affected the award at issue in the case.  
First, the court determined that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his 
authority by enjoining nonparties to the agreement.233  Next, the court found 
that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by enforcing an in-
term covenant not to compete over an excessively broad area of land.234  As 
previously noted, however, it is problematic to state that the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority in this situation. 235  In actuality, the arbitrator 
confined his decision to the express terms of the contract by issuing an 
injunction with the term “affiliate” as defined in the contract, and enforcing 
as drafted the contractual in-term covenant not to compete.236 
 
229. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
230. 9 U.S.C. § 11 
231. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273 (“[I]n no case do [the provisions of § 11] act as a 
bar to informal and expert determination of the matter.”). 
232. See infra Part I.C. 
233. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009). 
234. Id. at 1293. 
235. See supra Part III.A. 
236. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286–89 (The decision finds fault with the arbitral award on 
the basis of the arbitrator’s use of the term “affiliate” as defined in the contract, explaining the 
arbitrator’s decision as “keeping in force the restrictive covenant” as drafted in the contract). 
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Another inherent problem with the Comedy Club decision involves the 
procedural characterization by which the court purported to act.  Though the 
Ninth Circuit claimed to vacate on grounds of manifest disregard, the court 
then remanded to the district court with instructions to immediately reinstate 
the award, albeit in a diluted form.237  Read in this light, it appears the Ninth 
Circuit in fact modified rather than vacated the award.  As such, the court 
should have looked to section 11 rather than the post-Hall Street, 
section 10(a)(4) version of manifest disregard upon which it relied.238 
Reconceptualization under section 10(a)(4) is superior to the Ninth 
Circuit’s construction because it remains faithful to the parties’ bargain and 
refrains from arbitrarily substituting a court’s opinion for an arbitrator’s.  
Additionally, reconceptualization would have required the court to conduct a 
narrower review than what actually occurred and left the merits of the 
decision undisturbed.  By examining the award alone, the court cannot 
expand the scope of its review to include a full review on the merits 
“smuggle[d] . . . in by the back door.”239 
1. Step One: Determining the Award’s Finality (Enforceability) 
To begin with, the Ninth Circuit did not, and should not have concluded 
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing a permanent 
injunction.240  Instead, the offense related to the scope of the permanent 
injunction.241  Accordingly, the court should have simply concluded that 
because the contract’s definition of the term “affiliate” violated CBPC 
section 16600, the award was unenforceable as written.  Next, the Ninth 
Circuit should not have described its decision to limit the in-term covenant 
not to compete as a vacatur on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his 
power by manifestly disregarding CBPC section 16600.242  Instead, the court 
should have followed an almost identical reconceptualized vacatur analysis 
as with the permanent injunction.  Since the breadth of the in-term covenant 
not to compete violated CBPC section 16600, the court simply could not 
 
237. See id. at 1294 (“We vacate the district court’s order confirming the arbitration award and 
remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the Partial Final Arbitration Award in so far 
as it enjoins CCI’s Affiliates, unless they are agents or otherwise acting for CCI, and to the extent it 
prevents CCI from opening or operating non-Improv clubs in counties in which CCI does not now 
operate or own an Improv club.”). 
238. Id. at 1289–94. 
239. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
240. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 1293. 
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enforce the award.243  By finding the award unenforceable, the court would 
have thereby determined that the arbitrators imperfectly executed their 
powers by not issuing a final and definite award.244 
2. Step Two: Modifying the Award 
Finding the award unenforceable and therefore not final, the court would 
have then moved on to step two of the reconceptualized analysis.  In this 
step, the court would have asked: was the award “imperfect in matter of 
form not affecting the merits of the controversy”?245  Since the first issue 
that the Ninth Circuit found offensive in the award amounted to the 
excessive scope of a single defined term,246 the court likely would have 
answered in the affirmative.  In its decision, the Comedy Club court 
essentially employed a blue-pencil test,247 editing the definition of “affiliate” 
by striking out the definition’s overreaching portion so that it conformed to 
the standards of section 16600 of California Business and Profession 
Code.248  The blue-pencil test falls within the category of equitable contract 
interpretation and construction techniques discussed previously as a method 
to limit ambiguity and potential judicial frolicking.249 
Next, the court would have asked: was the award as it related to the 
second issue—the overly broad in-term covenant not to compete—
”imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy”?250  
Since a simple modification of the in-term covenant not to compete effected 
the intent of the award and promoted justice without affecting the merits, the 
court likely would have again answered in the affirmative.  Analogous to the 
use of the blue-pencil test on the preceding definition, the Comedy Club 
 
243. Id. 
244. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
245. 9 U.S.C. § 11(c). 
246. See Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1286 (“[P]recluding non-party relatives or ex-spouses from 
opening or operating improv-comedy-related businesses or restaurants violates CBPC [section] 
16600 . . . By restricting non-party relatives and ex-spouses from engaging in a lawful business, the 
injunctions, with respect to those persons exceed the arbitrator’s authority.”). 
247. “A judicial standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the 
offending words.  Under this standard, only the offending words are invalidated if it would be 
possible to delete them simply by running a blue pencil through them, as opposed to changing, 
adding, or rearranging words.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 196 (9th ed. 2009). 
248. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1287–88. 
249. See supra Part III.B.2. 
250. 9 U.S.C. § 11(c). 
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court simply limited the scope of the covenant to counties where Comedy 
Club, Inc.’s improv clubs currently operate. 251 
These actions by the Ninth Circuit in Comedy Club perfectly illustrate a 
court’s ability “to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the 
parties” “[w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the 
merits of the controversy.”252  By simply approaching these edits as 
modifications to an otherwise unenforceable arbitral award, the Ninth 
Circuit would have refrained from performing a de novo merits review and 
avoided characterizing the award as an excess of authority.  To the extent 
that an aggrieved party—against whom a court modifies an award—
disagrees with a modification, the party still has full access to the appellate 
process of the courts.253  Once illustrated, the reconceptualization’s utility 
becomes readily apparent, replacing the ambiguity of manifest disregard 
with a straight-forward standard of review under the FAA.  At the same 
time, the analysis promotes rather than compromises arbitral finality by 
confining judicial review to the award only, thereby protecting and 
maintaining the integrity of arbitration’s benefit of the bargain. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street in 2008, the lower 
courts have grappled with the Court’s assertion about the exclusivity of FAA 
sections 10 and 11 for vacatur and modification of arbitral awards.  When 
coupled with the Court’s apparent uneasiness with the foundation of 
manifest disregard in Wilko, circuit courts have split over the continued 
validity of manifest disregard as ground for vacatur.  However, one thing is 
clear: based on the history and ambiguity inherent in the manifest disregard 
doctrine, any remnant of the doctrine serves to frustrate one of the critical 
benefits of the arbitration bargain: finality. 
With the current split among the circuit courts, the state of the law of 
manifest disregard remains suspended, awaiting a conclusive declaration 
from the Supreme Court.  When the Court makes this decision, by 
reconceptualizing a “final” award under FAA section 10(a)(4) and allowing 
an increased power to modify for enforceability under section 11(c), the 
Court can provide a tool to lower courts that will allow them to have some 
 
251. Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1293. 
252. 9 U.S.C. § 11. 
253. Indeed, Julius Henry Cohen trumpeted this point in his description of the new federal 
arbitration process: “When the award has been entered as a judgment, of course, an appeal may be 
taken as from an ordinary judgment in an action, and similarly an appeal may be taken from an order 
vacating, modifying, or correcting the award though the statute does not specifically prescribe this.”  
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 273. 
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semblance of supervision over arbitral awards while leaving the merits of the 
awards undisturbed.  When parties contract for arbitration, they agree on a 
gamble.  However, not all gambles pay off, and the FAA already safeguards 
the procedural fairness required to maintain the integrity of arbitration 
proceedings.  By reconceptualizing the traditional notion of finality, courts 
will put their supervisory tools to better use. 
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